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INTRODUCTION
The Illinois Supreme Court’s holding in People v. Edwards1
demonstrates its intent to change the Illinois successive postconviction
actual innocence standard to parallel the federal habeas actual innocence
gateway standard. The Edwards court’s muddled holdings and reliance on
U.S. Supreme Court cases Schlup v. Delo2 and Sawyer v. Whitley3
demonstrate that objective. However, such an objective is unfounded and
unnecessary. Edwards was wrongly decided, and therefore, the Illinois
Supreme Court should reverse Edwards and return to the standard set forth
in People v. Ortiz.4
Illinois has a long history of allowing prisoners to file postconviction
actual innocence petitions. In 1996, the Illinois Supreme Court boldly
declared in People v. Washington5 that it would interpret the Illinois
constitution’s due process clause differently from the way the U.S. Supreme
Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in
Herrera v. Collins6 by recognizing a substantive due process claim of actual
innocence.7 The Illinois Supreme Court majority wrote:
We think that the Court overlooked that a “truly persuasive demonstration of
innocence” would, in hindsight, undermine the legal construct precluding a
substantive due process analysis. The stronger the claim—the more likely it is that a
convicted person is actually innocent—the weaker is the legal construct dictating that
the person be viewed as guilty. . . . We believe that no person convicted of a crime
should be deprived of life or liberty given compelling evidence of actual innocence.8

In essence, by recognizing a substantive due process claim for actual
innocence, the Illinois Supreme Court declared that the Illinois constitution
would give actual innocence claims greater protection than would the
Federal Constitution.9
Any postconviction petition filed after the first petition is considered a
successive postconviction petition. Until Edwards, the standard for a court
granting leave to file a successive postconviction actual innocence petition
required the petitioner’s claim to be “of such conclusive character that it

1

2
3
4
5
6

7
8
9

969 N.E.2d 829 (Ill. 2012).
513 U.S. 298 (1995).
505 U.S. 333 (1992).
919 N.E.2d 941 (Ill. 2009).
665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 1996).
506 U.S. 390 (1993).
See id. at 404, 407 n.6; Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1337.
Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1336 (emphasis added) (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417).
Id. at 1337.
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would probably change the result [of] retrial.”10 In Edwards, the court
described a winning successive postconviction actual innocence petition as
one in which the petitioner puts forth a “colorable claim of actual
innocence” through documentation that raises the probability that “it is
more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in
the light of the new evidence.”11 On one hand, the court may have relaxed
the standard for granting leave of court to file a successive postconviction
petition by using the term “colorable.” On the other hand, despite the
court’s recent suggestion to the contrary,12 the court may have made it more
difficult by using the phrase “no reasonable juror.”13 Additionally, the
Edwards court cited federal case law and used language directly from
Schlup.14 The muddled language and conflicting precedent in Edwards has
left lower courts and practitioners confused because of the possibility that it
created a new standard for granting leave of court for successive
postconviction actual innocence petitions.
This Comment will demonstrate how Edwards created a more
stringent standard for granting leave of court to file successive
postconviction actual innocence petitions that resembles the federal habeas
actual innocence gateway standard. Part I provides background on the
Illinois Postconviction Act, relevant Illinois case law, the federal habeas
actual innocence gateway standard, and the Edwards decision. Part II
untangles the language of Edwards and examines the effects of the decision
in the Illinois appellate courts. Part III addresses policy considerations both
for and against a more stringent standard and demonstrates why Edwards
was wrongly decided and should be reversed. Finally, Part IV describes the
implications for the Illinois Supreme Court’s position.

10

People v. Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d 941, 950 (Ill. 2009) (quoting People v. Morgan, 817
N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ill. 2004)); accord People v. Munoz, 941 N.E.2d 318, 325 (Ill. App. Ct.
2010).
11
Illinois v. Edwards, 969 N.E.2d 829, 836 (Ill. 2012) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298, 327 (1995)).
12
The Illinois Supreme Court declared, “[o]ur commitment” to the Washington standard
“is unwavering. . . . [W]e have not strengthened that standard, as the State hopes we did in
Edwards. In both cases, we reiterated that Washington provides the appropriate standard for
ultimate relief.” People v. Coleman, No. 113307, 2013 WL 5488934, ¶ 93 (Ill. Oct. 3,
2013); see infra note 141.
13
Edwards, 969 N.E.2d at 836.
14
Id.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. THE POSTCONVICTION HEARING STATUTE

The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act)15 allows prisoners
to collaterally attack their convictions on constitutional grounds.16 The Act
provides an additional remedy for them to pursue claims that were not made
on direct appeal or that are based on facts not in the record.17 The Act is
composed of three stages of review for first petitions; if the petitioner
successfully passes through all three stages, the petitioner will be granted a
retrial.18
1. Stage One
The first stage of the Act, often filed pro se, requires the petitioner’s
claim to survive summary dismissal.19 To survive dismissal, the petitioner
must give “a gist” of a claim.20 The court of appeals has found petitions
that provide newly discovered evidence that is neither fantastic nor
delusional are sufficient to support a “gist of a meritorious claim.”21 If the
judge fails to find “a gist” of a claim, the judge will dismiss the claim as
“frivolous or patently without merit.”22 The judge is required to give
reasons in a written order for dismissing these claims as “frivolous or
patently without merit.”23 The State is not allowed to respond at this

15

725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1 (2010).
See Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d at 947; Kerry J. Bryson, A Guide to the Illinois Post-conviction
Hearing Act, 91 ILL. B.J. 248, 248 (2003).
17
Bryson, supra note 16, at 248–49.
18
Id. at 249.
19
See People v. Porter, 521 N.E.2d 1158, 1159–62 (Ill. 1988) (holding dismissal of
postconviction petitions constitutional); Bryson, supra note 16, at 249–50.
20
See Bryson, supra note 16, at 249 & n.18 (citing People v. Edwards, 757 N.E.2d 442,
445–46 (Ill. 2001) (noting the “gist” threshold and describing an earlier People v. Edwards
as “criticiz[ing] several appellate court decisions holding that petitioner must plead sufficient
facts from which the trial court could find a valid claim of deprivation of a constitutional
right, noting that this standard imposes too heavy a burden on petitioner and conflicts with
precedent which requires only a limited amount of detail” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
21
People v. Sparks, 913 N.E.2d 692, 698–99 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); see also Edwards, 757
N.E.2d at 452–53 (finding that a pro se petitioner’s statement that his attorney at trial refused
his request to appeal constituted a gist of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel).
22
Bryson, supra note 16, at 249; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-2 (2010).
23
Bryson, supra note 16, at 249; see People v. Collins, 782 N.E.2d 195, 200 (Ill. 2002)
(upholding a district court’s dismissal of the petition as frivolous and patently without merit
because the petition contained no affidavits, records, or other evidence or explanation for
why such supporting documentation was not included).
16
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stage.24 The petitioner may appeal, and the appellate court then applies a de
novo review standard.25
2. Stage Two
If the petitioner successfully passes stage one, the petitioner moves to
the second stage of securing an evidentiary hearing.26 At this stage, the
court may appoint counsel for the petitioner if the petitioner cannot afford
one.27 To successfully secure an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner must
make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, such as ineffective
assistance of counsel, a Brady violation, or actual innocence.28 The record
must also show that (1) appointed counsel ascertained petitioner’s
deprivation of his or her constitutional rights by consulting with the
petitioner in person or by mail, (2) counsel examined the trial record, and
(3) counsel made any necessary changes to the pro se petition.29 Appointed
counsel must demonstrate that these requirements have been met, or any
subsequent dismissal of the petition will be reversed and remanded for
further proceedings under the Act.30 The State may answer or move to
dismiss the petition at this stage.31 However, all “well-pleaded facts that are
not positively rebutted by the trial record are to be taken as true,”32 and
waiver and res judicata claims may be waived by the court “when the
24
See Bryson, supra note 16, at 249; see also People v. Gaultney, 675 N.E.2d 102, 106
(Ill. 1996); People v. Ponyi, 734 N.E.2d 935, 939–40 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
25
Bryson, supra note 16, at 250.
26
Id.
27
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-4 (explaining that “the court shall appoint counsel if
satisfied that the petitioner has no means to procure counsel”).
28
See People v. Beaman, 890 N.E.2d 500, 502 (Ill. 2008) (examining a postconviction
petition alleging a Brady violation); see also People v. Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d 941, 948–49 (Ill.
2009); People v. Morgan, 817 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ill. 2004); People v. Washington, 665
N.E.2d 1330, 1336–37 (Ill. 1996). A Brady violation occurs when the prosecution fails to
disclose material evidence favorable to the accused, a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)
(“[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process . . . .”).
29
Bryson, supra note 16, at 250 (citing ILL. SUP. CT. R. 651(c)).
30
Id. at 250; see ILL. SUP. CT. R. 651(c) (“The record filed in that court shall contain a
showing, which may be made by the certificate of petitioner’s attorney, that the attorney has
consulted with petitioner by phone, mail, electronic means or in person to ascertain his or her
contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights, has examined the record of the
proceedings at the trial, and has made any amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are
necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions.”); see also People v.
Guest, 655 N.E.2d 873, 887 (Ill. 1995) (holding that absence of a Rule 651(c) certificate is
harmless if the record shows that counsel satisfied the Rule’s requirements).
31
Bryson, supra note 16, at 251.
32
Id. at 250 (quoting People v. Childress, 730 N.E.2d 32, 35 (Ill. 2000)).
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record on appeal is insufficient to support the petitioner’s claim, where the
alleged waiver stems from ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal,
where the law on an issue has changed since that issue was considered and
rejected, or where fundamental fairness so requires.”33 This stage is also
appealable with a de novo standard of review.34
3. Stage Three
The last stage of the Act grants the petitioner an evidentiary hearing to
put on his evidence in the hope of securing a new trial.35 The petitioner
bears the burden of showing that his constitutional rights were violated.36
The petitioner may appeal the decision, but the standard of review on such
an appeal is “manifestly erroneous,” a significantly higher standard than the
de novo standard applied in the previous two stages.37 Thus, the trial
court’s determination at the third stage will likely be final and probably will
not be reversed on appeal.
4. Successive Postconviction Petitions
It is well established that the Act “contemplates the filing of a single
post-conviction petition.”38 However, a court may grant leave for
successive petitions if the petitioner can show that “fundamental fairness”
requires it.39 Courts employ the “cause and prejudice” test to determine
whether prior postconviction petitions were “deficient in some fundamental
way.”40
33

Id. at 251 (citation omitted); see People v. Gardner, 771 N.E.2d 26, 34 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002).
34
Bryson, supra note 16, at 251.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
People v. Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Ill. 2009); Bryson, supra note 16, at 251.
38
Bryson, supra note 16, at 251; see People v. Morgan, 817 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ill. 2004);
see also Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d at 947.
39
Morgan, 817 N.E.2d at 527; People v. Pitsonbarger, 793 N.E.2d 609, 620–21 (Ill.
2002); Bryson, supra note 16, at 251.
40
Bryson, supra note 16, at 251 (citing People v. Flores, 606 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (Ill.
1992)); see Pitsonbarger, 793 N.E.2d at 621. The test is intended to limit successive and
frivolous postconviction petitions. See Bryson, supra note 16, at 251 (citing Flores, 606
N.E.2d at 1083). “In pursuit of the latter objective, the legislature has also seen fit to enact
section 22–105 of the Code of Civil Procedure,” People v. Tidwell, 923 N.E.2d 728, 732 (Ill.
2010), which is intended “to curb the large number of frivolous collateral pleadings filed by
prisoners which adversely affect the efficient administration of justice, and to compensate
the courts for the time and expense incurred in processing and disposing of them,” People v.
Conick, 902 N.E.2d 637, 643 (Ill. 2008). To satisfy the cause and prejudice test, the
petitioner must demonstrate to the court that an “external factor impeded efforts to raise the
claim in the initial post-conviction proceeding (cause) and that application of waiver would
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The petitioner can bypass the cause and prejudice test if he can make a
showing of actual innocence.41 To do so, the petitioner must show newly
discovered evidence that is material and noncumulative.42 Evidence found
postconviction that could not have been discovered earlier with the exercise
of due diligence is considered to be newly discovered.43 Evidence is
cumulative when it does not add anything to what has already been
presented to the jury.44 Prior to Edwards, the new evidence had to be “of
such a conclusive character that it would probably change the result of
retrial.”45
This standard was developed considerably in Ortiz, a successive
postconviction petition case at the Act’s third stage.46 In Ortiz, petitioner
“Salvador Ortiz was convicted of first degree murder after a bench trial and
sentenced to 47 years in prison.”47 The conviction relied heavily on the
eyewitness accounts of Christopher Estavia and Edwin Villariny, despite
the fact that both witnesses later recanted their statements to the police prior
to trial.48 The trial judge found that the forensic and ballistic evidence
corroborated Estavia’s and Villariny’s original statements to the police.49

deny the petitioner consideration of an error that ‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting
conviction or sentence violates due process’ (prejudice).” Bryson, supra note 16, at 251
(quoting Pitsonbarger, 793 N.E.2d at 624).
41
Pitsonbarger, 793 N.E.2d at 621.
42
People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1336 (Ill. 1996); see Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d at
950; Morgan, 817 N.E.2d at 527.
43
Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d at 950. In Ortiz, a previously unknown witness to the crime came
forward to the defendant’s mother ten years after the trial. Due to the witness’s location
during the crime, it would have been impossible for the defendant to have seen him.
Furthermore, the witness made himself unavailable by moving to Wisconsin shortly after the
murder. Thus, the court held the man to be a new witness. Id.
44
People v. Molstad, 461 N.E.2d 398, 402 (Ill. 1984) (explaining that evidence might
not be cumulative if it “goes to an ultimate issue in the case”); see also Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d at
951 (“Hernandez’s testimony supplied a first-person account of the incident that directly
contradicted the prior statements of the two eyewitnesses for the prosecution. This
testimony was not merely cumulative to Dunlam’s testimony supporting defendant’s alibi
defense, or to Estavia’s and Villariny’s recantations of their prior statements. Rather, it
added to what was before the fact finder.”). Evidence that would merely impeach a
witness’s credibility is not considered material and noncumulative. See People v. Smith, 685
N.E.2d 880, 892–93 (Ill. 1997).
45
People v. Harris, 794 N.E.2d 181, 188 (Ill. 2002) (citations omitted); see also Ortiz,
919 N.E.2d at 950 (quoting Morgan, 817 N.E.2d at 527).
46
Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d 941.
47
Id. at 943.
48
Id. at 943–44.
49
Id. at 944–45.
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In his third postconviction petition, rewritten by his attorneys,50 Ortiz
based his actual innocence claim on the new eyewitness testimonies of
Sigfredo Hernandez, Daniel Huertas, and Victor Ocasio.51 In affidavits,
Huertas and Hernandez claimed to have witnessed three other people—not
the defendant—beat and shoot the victim.52 They stated that they did not
see Ortiz at the crime scene.53 Ocasio claimed to have witnessed the crime
from a pay phone and did not mention seeing Ortiz.54
The trial court denied Ortiz’s third successive postconviction petition
for a retrial after the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing in stage three,
finding that the eyewitness testimony was cumulative and did not meet the
required standard for newly discovered evidence for an actual innocence
claim.55 The appellate court reversed the trial court and remanded the case
for a new trial, and the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the appellate court. 56
The Illinois Supreme Court held the eyewitness testimonies constituted
newly discovered evidence because the two eyewitnesses were previously
unknown to the petitioner.57 To determine whether to grant a new trial, the
court considered “whether the evidence offered by [the petitioner] ‘is of
such a conclusive character that it would probably change the result of
retrial.’”58 The court explained that the new evidence would strengthen the
petitioner’s claim of innocence at retrial when weighed against the
conflicting eyewitness accounts.59 However, the court restated that “this
does not mean that [the petitioner] is innocent, merely that all of the facts
and surrounding circumstances, including the testimony of [the petitioner’s

50

Id. at 945. Ortiz filed a pro se postconviction petition on February 17, 2004, and his
new counsel substituted a different version on August 10, 2004. Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. Ocasio’s affidavit had also been presented in Ortiz’s second postconviction
petition. Id.
55
Id. at 946.
56
Id. at 943.
57
Id. at 95051.
58
Id. at 951 (quoting People v. Harris, 794 N.E.2d 181, 188 (Ill. 2002)).
59
Id. at 952 (citing People v. Molstad, 461 N.E.2d 398, 40102 (Ill. 1984)) (“Thus, at
retrial, the evidence of defendant’s innocence would be stronger when weighed against the
recanted statements of the State’s eyewitnesses. The fact finder will be charged with
determining the credibility of the witnesses in light of the newly discovered evidence and
with balancing the conflicting eyewitness accounts.”). Molstad involved a case of actual
innocence on direct appeal rather than in a postconviction petition. Molstad, 461 N.E.2d at
400. Nevertheless, the court adopted the same standard for new evidence in postconviction
petitions as on direct appeal. Id. at 40102.
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witnesses], should be scrutinized more closely to determine the guilt or
innocence of [the petitioner].”60
In Illinois courts, the Ortiz standard—applied in conjunction with the
appropriate evidentiary standard—remained the test to determine whether to
grant leave to file successive postconviction petitions or to allow petitions
to continue to subsequent stages up until the Illinois Supreme Court decided
Edwards.61
B. THE FEDERAL HABEAS ACTUAL INNOCENCE GATEWAY STANDARD

Understanding federal actual innocence law is crucial to understanding
Illinois actual innocence cases. The following sections explain the federal
standards set forth in Herra v. Collins and Schlup v. Delo.
1. Herrera v. Collins
The U.S. Supreme Court in Herrera v. Collins rejected actual
innocence as a substantive due process claim, insisting that “[c]laims of
actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held
to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent
constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal
proceeding.”62 However, the Court did not bar actual innocence claims
entirely. Rather, the Court acknowledged that if a “proper showing of
actual innocence” is made such that it would be a “fundamental miscarriage
of justice” not to hear the claim, the Court could make an exception.63 The
Court also acknowledged that “a claim of ‘actual innocence’ is not itself a
constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas
petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim
considered on the merits.”64 Thus, in federal habeas cases, a habeas petition
that is barred for whatever reason—such as when the state court rejects a
petitioner’s claim on procedural grounds65 or the petitioner fails to bring the

60
Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d at 952 (quoting Molstad, 461 N.E.2d at 402) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
61
See People v. Anderson, 929 N.E.2d 1206, 121112 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); People v.
Gillespie, 941 N.E.2d 441, 460 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). For example, when deciding whether
the petitioner passes the first stage of the Act, Illinois courts take the facts pleaded as true
and apply the Ortiz standard—whether the newly discovered, material, noncumulative
evidence “is of such a conclusive character that it would probably change the result of
retrial”—to those facts. Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d at 951; see, e.g., People v. Parker, 975 N.E.2d 78,
91–93 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012), appeal denied, 979 N.E.2d 885 (Ill. 2012).
62
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).
63
Id. at 404.
64
Id. (emphasis added).
65
See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011).
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claim on direct review66—may be allowed if the petitioner makes an actual
innocence claim coupled with a claim alleging an independent
constitutional procedural error.67 The actual innocence claim opens the
door for a court to examine an otherwise barred freestanding constitutional
violation. The actual innocence claim thus acts as a “gateway” to the rest of
the formerly prohibited claim. Schlup v. Delo, decided shortly after
Herrera, created the federal standard for actual innocence gateway claims.
Schlup, discussed below, provides insight into the meaning of Edwards.
2. Schlup v. Delo
The U.S. Supreme Court decided Schlup two years after Herrera.68
The petitioner, Schlup, was convicted of murdering a fellow prison inmate
and sentenced to death.69 After exhausting his state remedies on direct and
collateral review, Schlup filed a pro se habeas petition alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to call witnesses who could
establish his innocence.70 The district court found his claim to be
procedurally barred, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court based
on its own examination of the record, determining that Schlup’s counsel
had not been ineffective.71 With new counsel, Schlup filed a second federal
habeas petition alleging that he was actually innocent and that his execution
would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.72 He also alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level and that the State had
committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence.73
Several affidavits were included with his petition.74 After the case worked
its way through the district court and court of appeals, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.75
The Supreme Court distinguished Schlup from Herrera.76 The
majority claimed that Schlup’s innocence claim was procedural, rather than
substantive, because his claim relied not on his innocence but on ineffective

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

See, e.g., Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998).
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404–05.
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
Id. at 30105.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 30607.
Id. at 307.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 30613.
Id. at 31317.
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counsel and the prosecution’s Brady violation.77 The Court found that
Schlup could obtain review of his procedurally barred petition if his case
fell within “the narrow class of cases . . . implicating a fundamental
miscarriage of justice” mentioned in Herrera.78 The Court found that it
would be a fundamental miscarriage of justice to refuse to hear the
procedurally barred claim assuming Schlup could demonstrate actual
innocence.79 Essentially, the Court found that Schlup’s claim of actual
innocence could act as a gateway to his procedurally barred habeas
petition.80 Furthermore, because Schlup’s innocence claim constituted a
gateway claim, his burden to prove his innocence claim was lower than that
for Herrera, who based his claim purely on substantive due process.81
It is important to note the Court’s lengthy discussion of the standards
set forth in two previous decisions, Sawyer v. Whitley82 and Murray v.
Carrier.83 The Sawyer and Carrier standards are two different standards of
proof that the Supreme Court uses in habeas cases.84 The Sawyer standard,
the more stringent of the two standards of proof, “was fashioned to reflect
the relative importance of a claim of an erroneous sentence.”85 Under the
Sawyer standard, a petitioner “must show by clear and convincing evidence
that but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the
petitioner eligible for the death penalty.”86 The less stringent Carrier
standard was created for the “extraordinary case[] where a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent.”87 To satisfy the Carrier standard, a petitioner must “show that it
is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found [him]
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”88
77
Id. at 314. Herrera brought a Brady violation claim in his successive petition, but the
court of appeals, affirming the district court’s determination, dismissed it for lack of
evidentiary basis. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 397 (1993). For an explanation of
Brady violations, see supra note 28.
78
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314–15 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing McCleskey v.
Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991)).
79
Id.
80
Id. at 315 (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404).
81
Id. at 31516.
82
505 U.S. 333 (1992).
83
477 U.S. 478 (1986).
84
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 320.
85
Id. at 325.
86
Id. at 323 (quoting Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992)). The Court also
remarked that the court of appeals misapplied the Sawyer standard. Id. However, since the
Court did not think the Sawyer standard, correctly or incorrectly applied, should be used at
all, the Court did not discuss the error further. Id. at 32324.
87
Id. at 321 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88
Id. at 327.
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In Schlup, the Supreme Court ultimately decided that the Carrier
standard was the more appropriate of the two, overruling the Eighth Circuit,
which had applied the Sawyer standard.89 The Court emphasized the
difference between the two standards: the Sawyer standard applies to cases
where the petitioner claims that he is ineligible for the death penalty but
does not claim to be innocent of the crime, whereas the Carrier standard
applies where the petitioner claims that he is actually innocent of the entire
crime of which he was convicted.90 According to the Court in Schlup,
because the correct analysis in actual innocence gateway cases seeks to
“balance the societal interests in finality, comity, and conservation of scarce
judicial resources with the individual interest in justice that arises in the
extraordinary case,” the Carrier standard is most appropriate.91
Applying the Carrier standard, the Court held that where the petitioner
uses actual innocence as the means for the federal court to examine an
otherwise procedurally barred freestanding constitutional violation, a
petitioner must “show that it is more likely than not that ‘no reasonable
juror’ would have convicted him.”92 The Court stated that at trial a
“reasonable juror would consider fairly all of the evidence presented.”93
Therefore, “the habeas court must consider what reasonable triers of fact are
likely to do.”94 The Court called it a probability standard; however, this
standard is stringent and extremely difficult to meet.95
Herrera and Schlup demonstrate the U.S. Supreme Court’s reluctance
to recognize actual innocence claims. First, in Herrera, the Court rejected
actual innocence as a substantive due process claim under the Constitution.
In Schlup, the Court recognized actual innocence as a gateway to otherwise
procedurally barred claims, but set the bar to win a retrial very high. The
test, a probability test based on the Carrier standard, requires petitioners to
“show that it is more likely than not that ‘no reasonable juror’ would have
convicted him.”96
89

Id. at 32527.
Id. at 32223.
91
Id. at 324.
92
Id. at 329.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 330.
95
See id.; see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 522 (2006). Bell, the only actual
innocence gateway habeas petition heard by the U.S. Supreme Court since Schlup,
demonstrates the extensive amount of new evidence necessary to meet the Schlup standard.
The Court granted Paul Gregory House’s habeas petition based on new DNA evidence, other
forensic evidence, and a new suspect. Id. at 54041, 548. “After careful review of the full
record, we conclude that House has made the stringent showing required by this exception;
and we hold that his federal habeas action may proceed.” Id. at 522.
96
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329.
90
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The federal standard for actual innocence gateway claims is difficult to
meet and is not petitioner friendly.97
C. THE PROBLEM OF PEOPLE V. EDWARDS

It is with these cases in mind—Hererra, Schlup, Washington, and
Ortiz—that Edwards must be understood. The Illinois Supreme Court
decided Edwards in April 2012.98 Edwards, the petitioner, was convicted of
first-degree murder under a theory of accountability and was sentenced to
twenty-eight years in prison.99 Only Edwards’s own statements linked him
to the crime scene.100 None of the State’s eyewitnesses or physical
evidence placed Edwards at the scene of the crime.101 Edwards was only
fifteen years old at the time of the murder.102
In total, Edwards filed four successive postconviction petitions, and
this case derived from his appeal of the denial of his third and fourth
successive postconviction petitions, which included claims of actual
innocence.103 In his third petition, Edwards presented newly discovered
evidence in the form of affidavits.104 One affidavit submitted by witness
Eddie Coleman stated that he, along with Willie Richards and “Little
Mikey,” committed the murder and that Edwards “had nothing to do with
this shooting.”105 Coleman said he failed to come forward earlier out of
fear of self-incrimination.106 In his fourth petition, Edwards presented alibi
affidavits from Dominique and Kathleen Coleman, stating that Edwards had

97

See id.; see also Bell, 547 U.S. at 522.
People v. Edwards, 969 N.E.2d 829 (Ill. 2012).
99
Id. at 832. Convictions based on a theory of accountability are particularly difficult to
overcome in postconviction actual innocence petitions because a person convicted under a
theory of accountability was convicted not based on the commission of the final act but
rather when:
98

(a) having a mental state described by the statute defining the offense, he or she causes another to
perform the conduct, and the other person in fact or by reason of legal incapacity lacks such a
mental state;
(b) the statute defining the offense makes him or her so accountable; or
(c) either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or
facilitate that commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid that other
person in the planning or commission of the offense.

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-2 (Supp. 2013).
100
Edwards, 969 N.E.2d at 832.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 833.
105
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
106
Id.
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been “with them in their residence before, during, and after the shooting
took place.”107 Dominique explained that she did not present this evidence
earlier because she was a minor and her mother, Kathleen, forbade her from
coming forward.108 Kathleen stated in her affidavit that she was afraid to
get involved in the case because of its serious nature and because several of
her family members were allegedly involved in the crime.109 She stated that
she had refused to testify or to allow her daughter Dominique to testify
despite numerous requests by Edwards’s counsel and had repeatedly been
uncooperative since Edwards’s incarceration.110 On appeal, the two
petitions were consolidated and both were denied.111
The Illinois Supreme Court began its analysis by reiterating that the
Act only contemplates one petition, but that a court may allow successive
petitions in one of two ways: either the petitioner must meet the cause and
prejudice test or, if the petitioner claims actual innocence, he must meet the
more relaxed standard of “fundamental miscarriage of justice.”112 The court
cited Ortiz for the proposition that the relaxed bar for actual innocence is a
judge-made exception.113 At this point, the court turned away from its usual
analysis. Instead of citing Ortiz and determining whether Edwards had
presented “newly discovered evidence” that would “probably change the
result on retrial,” the court stated the standard as follows: “[W]e hold today
that leave of court should be denied only where it is clear, from a review of
the successive petition and the documentation provided by the petitioner
that, as a matter of law, the petitioner cannot set forth a colorable claim of
actual innocence.”114 The court then restated the standard but varied its
language. In its second articulation of the holding the court wrote: “Stated
differently, leave of court should be granted when the petitioner’s
supporting documentation raises the probability that ‘it is more likely than
not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the
new evidence.’”115 Despite its claim that the second articulation of the
holding is merely a restatement of the first, the second holding’s use of very
different language suggests otherwise.

107

Id. at 833–34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 834.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id. Interestingly, Justice Charles Freeman, the same justice who wrote the majority
opinion in People v. Washington, authored the opinion in this case.
112
Id. at 835–36.
113
Id. at 836.
114
Id.
115
Id. (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)).
108

2014]

LOSING OUR INNOCENCE

209

Adding to the confusion, the court relied on conflicting case law to
support the two different holdings. To support its first holding, the court
cited People v. Smith, an Illinois case predating Ortiz.116 Smith cited
Sawyer, the federal habeas case, for the proposition that a petitioner must
provide enough documentation to set forth a colorable claim of actual
innocence.117 Sawyer is the same case the U.S. Supreme Court rejected in
Schlup for creating too high a standard under which to evaluate
postconviction actual innocence gateway claims. But when restating the
holding, the Edwards court cited and quoted Schlup. Thus, in an attempt to
clarify its holding, the Edwards court used conflicting Supreme Court
precedent.
The court also noted that, according to the Act’s legislative history, the
Act was intended to be consistent with federal law insofar as the Act was
intended to only allow one postconviction petition.118 The court stated that
the Illinois Act “disfavor[s]” successive postconviction petitions, noting
that it was intended to be consistent with federal law’s prohibition of
multiple habeas petitions and thus only allows one postconviction
petition.119 Therefore, the court reasoned, the legislative history “clearly
support[s] our conclusion that the ‘colorable claim of actual innocence’
standard should apply” to successive postconviction actual innocence
petitions.120 As a result, the court rejected the petitioner’s argument that
successive petitions should be read with the same standard as first-time
petitions.121
The Edwards court also added an element from federal law to the
“newly discovered” evidence standard in Illinois actual innocence claims. 122
In addition to the requirement that evidence of actual innocence be newly
discovered, material, and not merely cumulative, the court stated that the
evidence must also be reliable.123 Here, the Illinois Supreme Court openly
acknowledged its reliance on the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent in
Schlup.124
Applying the standard created earlier in the opinion as well as the new
reliability requirement to Edwards, the court concluded that Edwards did
116

Id. (citing People v. Smith, 794 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339–40 (1992) (defining actual innocence in
the context of federal habeas petitions as a colorable claim of factual innocence).
118
Edwards, 969 N.E.2d at 837.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 837–38.
122
Id. at 838.
123
Id. (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995)).
124
Id.
117
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not “set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence,” nor stated the other
way, did he “raise the probability that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.”125
II. ANALYSIS
Edwards has created confusion about what the exact standard is in
Illinois for granting successive postconviction actual innocence petitions.
Despite the confusion caused by the Edwards court’s two holdings and
conflicting use of precedent, the case establishes a higher standard for
petitioners filing successive postconviction petitions of actual innocence.
This higher standard is evidenced by the language of the opinion and the
continued use of federal precedent, and has been bolstered by the lower
courts’ interpretations of the Edwards standard. To begin that discussion, I
will first untangle the text of the case. I will then turn to the lower courts’
interpretations of Edwards in recent cases.
A. LANGUAGE PROBLEMS AND CONFUSION IN PEOPLE V. EDWARDS

The holding in Edwards is stated in two conflicting ways. The court’s
first iteration of the holding states:
With respect to those seeking to relax the bar against successive postconviction
petitions on the basis of actual innocence, we hold today that leave of court should be
denied only where it is clear, from a review of the successive petition and the
documentation provided by the petitioner that, as a matter of law, the petitioner cannot
set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence.126

From this statement, it appears that the standard for filing postconviction
petitions rests on the term “colorable claim of actual innocence.” The term
“colorable” suggests a standard based on probability or reasonable chance.
In other words, a “colorable claim of actual innocence” would be a claim
for which there is a reasonable chance that the petitioner is innocent.
However, immediately following the first articulation of the holding, the
court wrote: “Stated differently, leave of court should be granted when the
petitioner’s supporting documentation raises the probability that ‘it is more
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the
light of the new evidence.’”127
This second statement of the holding reads very differently from the
first iteration and is internally contradictory. The first part of the second
statement of the holding, which reads, “raises the probability that it is more
125

See id. at 837–38.
Id. at 836 (internal citations omitted) (citing People v. Smith, 794 N.E.2d 367, 374
(Ill. App. Ct. 2003)).
127
Id. (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327).
126
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likely than not,” echoes the first statement of the holding and its focus on
probability. However, the court then explains that the documentation must
demonstrate that there is no doubt of the petitioner’s innocence because “no
reasonable juror” would have convicted the petitioner had this new
evidence been presented. The mixture of “no reasonable juror” with the
probability standard is confusing because readers cannot discern which part
of the holding is more important. On one hand, taken with the first
statement of the holding, the suggestion of weighing probability seems
more important than the certainty that “no juror” would convict the
defendant on retrial. On the other hand, “no reasonable juror” is very
strong language and cannot be ignored.
Compounding the confusion, the court also relied upon conflicting
precedent. Immediately before stating the two contradictory versions of the
holding, the court cited Ortiz to support the idea that showing actual
innocence relaxes the bar against successive petitions.128 The court also
cited Ortiz and Washington when it defined the elements of actual
innocence: “The elements of a claim of actual innocence are that the
evidence in support of the claim must be ‘newly discovered’; material and
not merely cumulative; and of such conclusive character that it would
probably change the result on retrial.”129 Thus, the court used the Ortiz
probability standard in parts of the opinion. However, after reviewing the
new evidence presented by Edwards, the court found that “it does not raise
the probability that, in light of the new evidence, it is more likely than not
that no reasonable juror would have convicted petitioner.”130 Immediately
following that statement, the court found that “[t]his evidence is not ‘of
such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on
retrial.’”131
In addition to citing Ortiz, the court also cited several federal habeas
cases to support its reasoning. In the first statement of the holding, the
court cited Sawyer;132 yet, in the second statement of the holding the court
cited Schlup.133 These citations are highly problematic because, as noted
earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court in Schlup blatantly rejected the Sawyer
standard in the actual innocence context as too stringent.134 Furthermore,
Sawyer addressed an erroneous sentence claim whereas Schlup specifically
128

Id. at 835–36 (citing People v. Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d 941, 950 (Ill. 2009)).
Id. at 838 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
130
Id. at 839 (emphasis added).
131
Id. (quoting People v. Morgan, 817 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ill. 2004)).
132
Id. at 836 (citing People v. Smith, 794 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003), which
cited and adopted Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992)).
133
Id. (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)).
134
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 325–26.
129
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addressed a claim of actual innocence.135 Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court
not only mixed federal law with Illinois law but also failed to correctly cite
federal actual innocence law.136 Furthermore, as discussed in Part II.B, the
federal standard, even under Schlup, is incredibly difficult to meet, in part
because the U.S. Supreme Court relies on state courts to adjudicate actual
innocence claims.137 This use of federal law in conjunction with Ortiz and
other Illinois law only compounds the confusion.
Nonetheless, the Illinois Supreme Court’s use of federal law in other
areas of the opinion suggests that the court intended to make the Illinois
standard parallel the federal standard. First, the Illinois Supreme Court
added an element, reliability, to the actual innocence claim directly from
Schlup, openly acknowledging the U.S. Supreme Court as its source.138
Second, when discussing whether to make the standard for successive
petitions the same as that for first petitions, the court cited the Act’s
legislative history in which a state senator remarked that allowing one
petition under the Illinois Act would make the Act consistent with federal
law.139 The court found these remarks sufficient to support its conclusion
that the first-stage analysis did not apply to successive petitions and that the
“colorable claim of actual innocence” standard should apply instead,
because federal habeas actual innocence gateway cases employ the
“colorable claim of actual innocence” language.140
Despite the many textual contradictions, it appears the court intended
to strengthen the requirements to get leave of court to file a successive
petition.141 While the court held onto some of the language from Ortiz, the
135

Id. at 325 (“Though the Sawyer standard was fashioned to reflect the relative
importance of a claim of an erroneous sentence, application of that standard to petitioners
such as Schlup would give insufficient weight to the correspondingly greater injustice that is
implicated by a claim of actual innocence.”).
136
Of course, the Illinois Supreme Court is not required to follow the federal actual
innocence standard. However, it is odd that the court should reject the federal standard in
Washington for being too strict only to later cite federal law in a subsequent case, written by
the same justice (Justice Freeman). The Illinois Supreme Court’s use of federal law is even
more confusing considering that the federal law the Illinois Supreme Court cites was rejected
by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too strict.
137
See supra Part I.B.
138
Edwards, 969 N.E.2d at 838 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324).
139
Id. at 837.
140
Id.
141
In an opinion released October 3, 2013, the Illinois Supreme Court states that
Edwards did not change the actual innocence standard. See People v. Coleman, No. 113307,
2013 WL 5488934, ¶ 93 (Ill. Oct. 3, 2013). However, this statement is unfounded for the
reasons stated above (including Edwards’s contradictory language, reliance on federal law,
and addition of a new reliability requirement taken directly from federal law). Furthermore,
the Coleman opinion dealt with a first-time petition at the third stage of the Act, not a
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court’s insistence on following each statement with language and citations
from federal cases, even if those citations were poorly applied,
demonstrates the court’s desire to create a higher bar for granting leave to
file successive postconviction actual innocence petitions. Regardless of
which federal standard is used, Schlup or Sawyer, Edwards raised the bar
for obtaining leave of court to file;142 choosing between Schlup and Sawyer
only changes the degree to which the bar has been raised.143 Furthermore,
adding Schlup’s reliability requirement and rejecting the first-stage analysis
in successive petitions clarifies the court’s intent. Despite the fact that the
Edwards opinion was written by the same justice who so vehemently
rejected Herrera in Washington,144 the court changed the Illinois successive
actual innocence petitions standard to more closely parallel the federal
actual innocence gateway standard.
B. EDWARDS’S IMPACT FOR PETITIONERS SEEKING LEAVE OF COURT

The lower courts’ decisions are the true indicator of whether, in
practice, Edwards changed the standard for granting leave to file successive
postconviction actual innocence petitions. Since the Edwards decision, the
lower appellate courts have decided several cases using the Edwards
standard. Interestingly, most of the opinions are unpublished, and of the
roughly thirty-five successive postconviction actual innocence petitions that
were decided by October 1, 2013, thirty-four of them were denied by the
court of appeals. One of those denials was overturned by the Illinois
Supreme Court, and one petition was granted by a court of appeals.145

successive petition seeking leave of court to file. Id. ¶ 98. Additionally, it would not be the
first time a court has said one thing and done another. See, e.g., John E. Kennedy, Federal
Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex v. Catrett with Adickes v. Kress and the
Evidentiary Problems Under Rule 56, 6 REV. LITIG. 227, 229–30 (1987) (“The Celotex Court
rejected that interpretation of Adickes, in the process explicitly approving the Adickes ruling
handed down some sixteen years earlier. Although Celotex and its progeny do not purport to
establish new law with respect to Rule 56, taken together they do signal a significant change
in attitude toward grants of summary judgment.”).
142
Edwards, 969 N.E.2d at 837; see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538–53 (2006)
(explaining the application of the “no reasonable juror” standard under Schlup and Sawyer as
applied to various types of new evidence a jury had not had available to consider in a case).
143
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324–27.
144
People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1335–36 (Ill. 1996) (“[W]e labor under no
self-imposed constraint to follow federal precedent in ‘lockstep’ in defining Illinois’ due
process protection. . . . We believe so as a matter of both procedural and substantive due
process. In terms of procedural due process, we believe that to ignore such a claim would be
fundamentally unfair.” (citations omitted)).
145
People v. Bruce, No. 1-09-3401, 2012 WL 6936105 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 12, 2012),
vacated, 978 N.E.2d 241 (Ill. 2012); see also People v. Adams, No. 1-11-1081, 2013 WL
4516943 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 23, 2013).
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The cases decided by the Illinois appellate courts after Edwards
demonstrate that Edwards created a more stringent standard for successive
petitions. In some cases, the petitions failed under the Ortiz standard, and
Edwards did not affect the decisions.146 But Edwards had a notable effect
in several other cases where the appellate courts used the new reliability
requirement to dismiss successive petitions.147 The following Sections
provide examples of (1) cases unaffected by Edwards; (2) cases that
demonstrate Edwards’s stricter standard; and (3) cases where Edwards’s
new reliability requirement raised the petitioners’ burden.
1. Cases Unaffected by Edwards
As one example, Edwards had little effect on the outcome in People v.
Spencer.148 The defendant, Robert Spencer, was found guilty on a theory of
accountability,149 a difficult charge to collaterally attack.150 Spencer’s claim
of innocence was based on the fact that police did not find his blood on
stereo equipment taken from the scene of the crime.151 However, because
the defendant was convicted on a theory of accountability, the absence of
his blood could not exculpate him.152 Thus, the court’s decision in Spencer
sheds little light on the full impact of Edwards.
In People v. Tellez, another case where Edwards had little effect, the
court denied the prisoner’s successive petition because the new evidence
from a 60 Minutes investigative report on bullet lead analysis “would have
no discernible impact on the result of defendant’s trial if there were further
proceedings under the Act.”153 Even if the new evidence were accepted as
true, the court stated, all of the other evidence previously used at trial would
146
See, e.g., People v. Brown, No. 1-09-2597, 2012 WL 6859503 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 21,
2012); People v. Hanible, Nos. 1-10-1537, 1-10-2400, 2012 WL 6950244 (Ill. App. Ct. Oct.
19, 2012); People v. Glinsey, No. 1-09-0608, 2012 WL 6934896 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 5,
2012); People v. Tellez, No. 1-10-1272, 2012 WL 6950176 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 21, 2012);
People v. Spencer, No. 1-09-0105, 2012 WL 6934890 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 6, 2012).
147
See, e.g., People v. Garcia-Sandoval, Nos. 1-11-2215, 1-11-3763, 2013 WL 1289148
(Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 29, 2013); People v. Strong, No. 2-10-1012, 2012 WL 6965370 (Ill. App.
Ct. Sept. 26, 2012); People v. Register, No. 3-10-0038, 2012 WL 6968363 (Ill. App. Ct. May
22, 2012).
148
2012 WL 6934890.
149
Id. at *1.
150
See People v. Anderson, 929 N.E.2d 1206, 1212 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); see also
discussion supra note 99 (describing convictions founded upon theories of accountability).
151
Spencer, 2012 WL 6934890, at *4.
152
Id. The trier of fact may use the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime as
evidence supporting a theory of accountability. See discussion supra note 99. Thus, it is
very difficult for a prisoner to prove actual innocence when he is convicted on a theory of
accountability.
153
No. 1-10-1272, 2012 WL 6950176, at *3 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 21, 2012).
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overwhelm the new evidence.154 The court pointed to three pieces of
evidence used at trial that could not be overcome by new evidence: (1) two
recorded conversations in which the petitioner had admitted his guilt; (2)
two acquaintances who stated that the petitioner had asked them to falsely
testify on his behalf at trial; and (3) police officers who testified as to the
type of gun the defendant used.155 As the court aptly explained it, the
forensics used in the case were far from the “l[i]nchpin” of the case against
the defendant, so the new contradictory evidence did little to undermine the
case against him.156 Indeed, it appears that the prosecution had a solid case
against the petitioner and the court could dismiss the petition under Ortiz.
2. Cases Demonstrating Edwards’s Stricter Standard
In other cases, Edwards functioned to create a stricter standard, even if
the courts did not explicitly acknowledge the change. In People v. Glinsey,
the court appeared to argue that Edwards did not change the standard.157 In
actuality, the court’s analysis demonstrates that the Edwards standard was
indeed stricter.158 The court reiterated the four requirements from Ortiz that
petitioners must satisfy to establish newly discovered evidence of actual
innocence.159 However, the court used the Edwards holding (“‘does not
raise the probability that, in light of this new evidence, it is more likely than
not that no reasonable juror would have convicted’ [the] defendant”160) to
determine whether the fourth Ortiz element (“would probably change the
result upon retrial”) had been met.161 The court stated that while the new
evidence—in the form of a recantation—would be enough to assert a
“reasonable doubt argument,” it was not “so conclusive that it would
change the result at trial.”162 The court omitted the word “probably” and
just stated, “would change the result at trial.”163 Thus, the appellate court
interpreted the Edwards standard to require that the result would change
instead of requiring that the result would probably change.

154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
No. 1-09-0608, 2012 WL 6934896 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 5, 2012).
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. (quoting People v. Edwards, 969 N.E.2d 829, 839 (Ill. 2012)).
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
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3. Cases Adding Edwards’s Reliability Requirement
The new element of reliability is proving to be a strong barrier to
granting leave to file successive petitions.164 In People v. Register, the
court began its analysis with the Ortiz standard.165 The court found that the
evidence offered in the petition was not newly discovered; rather, the
evidence was cumulative and “was not ‘of such conclusive character that it
would likely change the result on retrial.’”166 The court stated that the
defendant knew about the witnesses prior to his trial, therefore their
statements were not new.167 Furthermore, the “new” witnesses’ statements
did not differ from those statements already proffered at trial and “would
not necessarily impeach the credibility of the State’s principal witness.”168
The court addressed the possibility of newly discovered evidence taking the
form of a witness recantation as well.169 Here, quoting Edwards, the court
stated that new evidence of actual innocence must be reliable.170 Because
the witness demonstrated uncertainty about the timing of his statements and
was not recanting his prior testimony, the court found that this new
evidence was not reliable.171 This finding is a sharp departure from the
reasoning in People v. Lofton, in which the court made it clear that the
credibility of the witness was to be determined at the evidentiary hearing
and not when determining whether to grant a successive petition.172
People v. Strong demonstrates a more stringent standard as well.173
First, like the court in Register, the Strong court adopted the reliability
requirement for newly discovered evidence.174 In Strong, the court stated
that the recanted testimony was neither newly discovered nor reliable.175
164
See, e.g., People v. Garcia-Sandoval, Nos. 1-11-2215, 1-11-3763, 2013 WL 1289148
(Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 29, 2013); People v. Strong, No. 2-10-1012, 2012 WL 6965370 (Ill. App.
Ct. Sept. 26, 2012); People v. Register, No. 3-10-0038, 2012 WL 6968363 (Ill. App. Ct. May
22, 2012).
165
Register, 2012 WL 6968363, at *1 (citing Edwards but using the language from
Ortiz).
166
Id. at *2 (quoting People v. Smith, 685 N.E.2d 880, 893 (1997)). Interestingly, the
Register court used the manifestly erroneous standard on review. Id. at *1. Other courts
used a de novo standard. See, e.g., Garcia-Sandoval, 2013 WL 1289148; Strong, 2012 WL
6965370.
167
Register, 2012 WL 6968363, at *2.
168
Id.
169
Id. at *3.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
People v. Lofton, 954 N.E.2d 821, 834 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (stating that credibility is
to be determined at the third stage evidentiary hearing and not at earlier stages).
173
People v. Strong, No. 2-10-1012, 2012 WL 6965370 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 26, 2012).
174
Id. at *6 (citing People v. Edwards, 969 N.E.2d 829, 838 (Ill. 2012)).
175
Id. at *7.
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Second, like the Glinsey court, the Strong court rejected the petition
because it found that an alternate theory, which could create reasonable
doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, did not satisfy the requirement that new
evidence would make it “more likely than not that no reasonable juror
would have convicted him.”176 The court stressed that the standard is “no
reasonable juror.”177 Thus, the Strong court interpreted the Edwards
standard as requiring a greater amount of certainty of a different outcome at
retrial than merely the probability of a different outcome.
In People v. Garcia-Sandoval the appellate court strongly emphasized
the new reliability requirement as well.178 The court’s ultimate denial did
not rely on the reliability of the new evidence;179 however, the court twice
stated in two separate paragraphs of the opinion that the new evidence must
be reliable, underscoring the importance of the requirement in the eyes of
the appellate court.180
The cases decided after Edwards reveal the wide spectrum of options
available to courts when deciding whether to grant leave of court. In some
instances, the facts allowed the courts to rely only on Ortiz to dismiss the
cases.181 Other times, courts read Edwards as abandoning the Ortiz
probability standard in favor of a near certainty standard.182 The new
reliability element equips the courts with a powerful tool to find the new
evidence unreliable and deny leave to file successive petitions.183 It is clear
that Edwards’s stricter standard makes it easier for courts to dismiss
successive postconviction actual innocence petitions.
III. POLICY
As explained in Part II, Edwards created a more stringent standard.
The cases decided since Edwards are not the end of the story, but they
certainly indicate that the standard for successive postconviction actual
innocence petitions is stricter than before. Yet, it is important to examine
whether a stricter standard for granting leave of court for successive
176

Id. at *6 (citing Edwards, 969 N.E.2d at 836).
Id. at *7 (emphasis added).
178
Nos. 1-11-2215, 1-11-3763, 2013 WL 1289148 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 29, 2013).
179
Id. at *6.
180
Id. at *4–5.
181
See, e.g., People v. Tellez, No. 1-10-1272, 2012 WL 6950176, at *3 (Ill. App. Ct.
Aug. 21, 2012); People v. Spencer, No. 1-09-0105, 2012 WL 6934890 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 6,
2012).
182
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Register, No. 3-10-0038, 2012 WL 6968363 (Ill. App. Ct. May 22, 2012).
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postconviction actual innocence petitions is good for Illinois from a policy
standpoint, given both the state of criminal law in Illinois, in which news of
exonerations occurs regularly, and the purpose of the Act.
Between 1989 and 2012, a staggering 311 DNA exonerations occurred
in the United States.184 However, considering the number of criminal cases
that do not have the benefit of DNA to scrutinize the validity of their
convictions, there are likely hundreds more innocent people in prison.
According to one study of 200 DNA exonerations, 79% of those wrongfully
convicted had faulty eyewitness identifications at their trials.185 Other
studies have demonstrated similarly appalling results.186 Thus, as Joshua
Dressler and George Thomas aptly put it, “eyewitness misidentification is
the single most common factor in wrongful convictions throughout the
United States.”187 It can be inferred that hundreds of innocent men and
women are in prison without the benefit of DNA evidence to exonerate
them. With these statistics in mind, a stricter standard for successive
postconviction actual innocence petitions is unjust, especially given the
truism that it would be better to let ten guilty defendants walk free than to
convict one innocent person.188
In People v. Washington, the Illinois Supreme Court took a
monumental step by refusing to interpret the Illinois constitution in lockstep
with the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has even
recognized that state criminal justice systems are the best forum for dealing
with actual innocence petitions.189 One of the reasons for such a strict
federal standard is, in the view of at least one Supreme Court Justice, that
state courts are more appropriate and better equipped to handle actual
184
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187
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innocence cases.190 Thus, the Supreme Court’s standard is extremely strict
and difficult to meet precisely because the states are the main forum for
innocence claims. For Illinois to make it more difficult to obtain leave of
court simply to file is therefore unjust. Furthermore, of the pre-Edwards
successive postconviction actual innocence petitions citing Ortiz, appellate
courts have granted only two successive petitions.191
Ortiz was
undoubtedly already strict enough, and there was no need for a stricter
standard.
Essentially, Edwards may require the petitioner to prove his case
before getting to the first stage of the Act, rather than at a retrial, because
the petition may proceed if and only if “no reasonable juror” would find the
defendant guilty.192 If this language is read literally, the court is asking
petitioners to prove their cases at the outset of the process, before any
evidentiary hearing and without the benefit of live witnesses. Today, with
our modern understanding of trial procedures and wrongful convictions, it
is evident that standards requiring near-certitude, such as DNA testing, do
not adequately protect the innocent.193 Furthermore, if Edwards has indeed
created a higher standard for granting leave to file successive
postconviction actual innocence petitions, then the standard for granting
leave of court to file a successive petition is at odds with the standard for
stage three evidentiary hearings. At stage three, the petitioner is held to the
“probably change the result on retrial” standard. What is the point of stage
three if the petitioner already proved her case just to get leave to file?
Edwards’s proponents may argue that the petitioner should have
gotten it right on the first petition and should be grateful for the chance to
submit successive petitions at all. Edwards’s proponents may further argue
that it is more difficult to put on and make a case in an evidentiary hearing
than the earlier stages where the petitioner must simply supply
documentation such as affidavits. But this view is unreasonable, especially
190

Id. at 427 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Instead, the Court assumes for the sake of
argument that a truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence would render any such
execution unconstitutional and that federal habeas relief would be warranted if no state
avenue were open to process the claim.”). Thus, it appears that the Court’s reasoning relies,
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See People v. Hill, No. 1-09-1657, 2011 WL 9692904 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 8, 2011);
People v. Munoz, 941 N.E.2d 318, 329 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). A Westlaw search revealed
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considering who the petitioners are in these cases. The petitioners are
prisoners in the state system who have little or no legal knowledge, have in
many cases very little schooling, and have very limited access to
information.194
Some cases require further investigation to prove
innocence, a challenging task from a prison cell. Furthermore, first
petitions are filed pro se more often than not.195 Legal assistance may come
later, but often, it is too late. With legal assistance, successive petitions are
often stronger than the first one.
In his recent article, Robert Smith disagreed with these assertions.196
Smith does believe that postconviction actual innocence petitions are
necessary for today’s criminal justice system in which trials are no longer
the great exposer of innocence and guilt.197 For nonprocedurally defaulted
claims, he proposes that petitioners must demonstrate their innocence by
clear and convincing evidence.198 In other words, petitioners would have to
prove that they are “highly probably innocent.”199 For gateway claims
where innocence is used to get to otherwise procedurally defaulted claims,
he proposes a lower standard of “reasonable probability of innocence.”200
He finds the Washington standard, and by extension the Ortiz standard, to
be too low, because it “does not adequately account for the societal interest
in securing and maintaining convictions against those who do commit
crimes,” and because some guilty people would walk free because the
standard of proof is 51% chance the person is innocent.201 He argues that it
would be unlikely that the state could retry the petitioner, and thus there is a
significant risk to society.202
However, Smith’s claims are unfounded. Of the sixty-eight published
cases in Illinois citing Washington as of October 1, 2013, only three
petitioners were granted new trials, and one of those trials was granted due
194
See Steven D. Hinckley, Bounds and Beyond: A Need to Reevaluate the Right of
Prisoner Access to the Courts, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 19, 43 (1987) (“[O]ver thirty percent of
all prisoners have less than an eighth grade education, as opposed to only nine percent with
less than an eighth grade education among the general population.”); see also Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487 (1969) (“Jails and penitentiaries include among their inmates a
high percentage of persons who are totally or functionally illiterate, whose educational
attainments are slight, and whose intelligence is limited.”); Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d
1433, 1435 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting a district court’s finding that Florida’s prison population
had “more than [a] 50% rate of inmate functional illiteracy”).
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to new DNA evidence.203 Thus, out of the sixty-eight cases, only two
resulted in new trials based on non-DNA, newly discovered evidence.204 Of
the pre-Edwards Illinois cases citing Ortiz, only two successive
postconviction actual innocence petitions were granted.205 Considering the
number of innocent people likely sitting in prison, three new trials is hardly
a frightening number.206 Justice trumps finality; an innocent person should
not serve time in the name of finality.
IV. THE BIGGER PICTURE
Edwards may have done far more than simply create a stricter standard
for granting leave of court for successive postconviction actual innocence
petitions. Despite the Illinois Supreme Court’s recent statement in People
v. Coleman that Edwards did not change the actual innocence standard,
decisions interpreting Edwards in the lower courts suggest otherwise.207
People v. Chest and People v. Cole demonstrate Edwards’s potential to
expand beyond granting leave of court to file a successive petition to later
stages of the Act.208
In Antoine Chest’s first postconviction petition, he challenged his
conviction of two counts of attempted first-degree murder.209 The trial
court had specifically found that Chest was the shooter.210 In his petition,
Chest produced an affidavit from another man charged with the attempted
murders who claimed that he had pleaded guilty to and committed the
attempted murders, and that the petitioner was not with him at the time of
the incident.211 The court cited Edwards extensively and specifically
emphasized the reliability requirement.212 The court denied this first-stage
petition, finding that the new evidence was not completely exculpatory and
203
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that the petitioner had not shown that it was “more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have convicted defendant.”213 The court used the
Edwards standard even though this was Chest’s first petition, not a
successive petition.
Similarly, the petitioner in Cole appealed the second-stage dismissal of
his first postconviction petition.214 Corzell Cole was convicted of firstdegree murder and attempted first-degree murder on an accountability
theory.215 Travaris Guy was the passenger in a car Cole drove.216 When
Cole pulled up at a stoplight behind a van with four people in it, Guy fired
four shots into the van, killing one person and injuring a second.217 Cole
sped from the scene and was later arrested in Colorado Springs,
Colorado.218 At trial, Cole did not put forth a defense and was convicted on
a theory of accountability.219 In his postconviction petition, Cole provided a
statement from Guy, the passenger and the shooter, and claimed that this
statement was newly discovered evidence because Guy had not yet been
apprehended at the time of Cole’s trial and thus could not speak on his
behalf for fear of self-incrimination.220 Despite the fact that this was not a
successive postconviction petition, the court relied on Edwards.221 The
court acknowledged that Edwards involved a successive petition and that
this was Cole’s first petition.222 However, the court still found the Edwards
standard applicable and held that Cole had to make a “substantial showing”
of actual innocence.223 In its analysis, the court stated that Guy’s evidence
did not “paint a colorable actual innocence claim” nor did it “make it more
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted petitioner in
light of such a claim.”224 Moreover, the court stated the evidence “is not of
such conclusive character that it would probably change the result of the
retrial.”225 The court did not cite Ortiz, but it did cite to the various
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holdings in Edwards that included the Ortiz standard.226 While both of
these petitions probably would have failed under the Ortiz standard, and the
court’s reasoning is solid in both cases, these cases demonstrate that the
potential reach of the Edwards decision expands far beyond just successive
actual innocence petitions.
In People v. Davis, the court of appeals noted that the Illinois Supreme
Court’s decision in Edwards provides a comment on the postconviction
actual innocence claims spectrum.227 The court quoted the portion of the
Edwards decision that added the reliability requirement for newly
discovered evidence.228 The appellate court reversed the trial court and
allowed the petitioner to proceed to the third stage evidentiary hearing.229
The court did not rule on the reliability of the witness, instead directing the
trial court to do so at the evidentiary hearing.230 However, once again, the
Edwards decision manifested itself in first petitions at later stages in the
Act.
The effects of Edwards reach beyond actual innocence postconviction
petitions as well. In People v. Nicholas and People v. Smith, the courts
applied Edwards to petitions advancing procedural claims under the cause
and prejudice test.231 In Nicholas, the petitioner alleged in his successive
postconviction petition both a procedural error—that his confession was
physically and psychologically coerced—and an actual innocence claim.232
In its analysis, the court held that Antonio Nicholas’s alleged procedural
error, which was analyzed under the cause and prejudice test, needed to
meet Edwards’s heightened standard, requiring a “‘more exacting’ or
‘substantial’ showing of cause and prejudice to be granted leave to file a
successive postconviction petition. A ‘gist’ of a claim of cause and
prejudice is insufficient.”233 Even though the scope of Edwards was limited
to successive postconviction actual innocence petitions, the appellate court
226
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in Nicholas found that Edwards’s heightened standard applies to procedural
postconviction successive petitions as well as actual innocence petitions.234
The court in People v. Smith similarly applied Edwards’s heightened
standard to the cause and prejudice standard, stating that the Illinois
Supreme Court had rejected the argument that successive petitions should
be evaluated under the same standard as first petitions, and therefore,
“rather than merely presenting the gist of a claim, [the petitioner] must
make a ‘more exacting’ showing of cause and prejudice to merit leave to
file a successive post-conviction petition.”235
Edwards has undoubtedly affected Illinois lower court decisions in
postconviction actual innocence petitions beyond those seeking leave to file
successive postconviction actual innocence petitions, and it remains to be
seen if this trend will continue in light of the Illinois Supreme Court’s
recent opinion in People v. Coleman.236
CONCLUSION
The standard for granting leave of court for successive postconviction
actual innocence petitions in Illinois is in a state of confusion. The
Edwards opinion is self-contradictory in many ways, leaving practitioners
and prisoners without a clear understanding of what standard applies.
However, analysis of the language and precedent used in the case
demonstrate that Edwards created a stricter standard that parallels the
federal habeas actual innocence gateway standard for granting leave of
court for successive postconviction actual innocence petitions.
Furthermore, the appellate courts’ application of the Edwards standard
illustrates this higher bar.
Despite the court’s opinion in People v. Coleman stating otherwise,237
the language of the Edwards opinion, the precedent used to support its
analysis, and the addition of a new reliability requirement from Schlup
demonstrates that Edwards created a stricter standard for granting leave of
court to file successive postconviction actual innocence petitions. Looking
to the history of actual innocence petitions, Edwards’s stricter standard is
unwarranted and unjust. Under the pre-Edwards standards, few petitions
resulted in retrial, and thus, raising the standard to parallel the federal
standard needlessly limits petitioners’ access to the channels of
postconviction justice. Furthermore, considering the number of wrongfully
convicted people who lack the benefit of exculpatory DNA evidence, the
234
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236
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standard for successive postconviction innocence petitions should not be
enhanced.
In conclusion, People v. Edwards heightened the standard for
successive postconviction actual innocence petitions to closely match the
federal actual innocence gateway standard. Not only is the added
stringency unnecessary because the prior standard functioned as a sufficient
barrier to getting leave of court to file successive postconviction actual
innocence petitions, but it is also unjust in light of the Illinois Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Illinois constitution and the relationship
between federal and state law. Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court
should overrule Edwards and return to the previous Ortiz standard.
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